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Governing Interdependent Financial Systems 
Lessons from the Vienna Initiative 
 
 
Katharina Pistor1  
Abstract: 
This paper argues that while financial markets have become transnational, their 
governance structures have remained national at the core: Fiscal responsibility 
for crises is ultimately born by the nation state where the crisis occurred – 
whether or not it bears any responsibility for regulatory or policy failures. The 
tension between the transnational nature of markets and national responsibility 
for these markets has been revealed once more by the global financial and the 
European sovereign debt crises. Against this background, the Vienna Initiative 
(VI) offers the prospect of an alternative governance regime. The VI was formed 
to manage the fallout from the global crisis in the former socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It brought together in an open and 
deliberative process the key stakeholders in the pan-European financial market, 
including transnational bank groups, fiscal authorities, regulators and central 
banks from home and host countries, the European Central Bank (as observer), 
the European Commission (EC), and several international financial institutions 
(IFIs). While each of these stakeholders had a manifest interest in a coordinated 
response, effective coordination required engineering to overcome the collective 
action problems they faced. The commitments stakeholders ultimately made to 
fend off a financial collapse went well beyond what they were legally obliged to 
                                                 
1 Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Erik Berglöf 
and Piroska Nagy for many helpful conversations and access to information and people familiar 
with the process, without which this paper could not have been written. In addition, I would like 
to thank participants at the Comparative Law and Economics Forum 2010 held at Yale, as well as 
those at the Conference on Contract Governance in Berlin in October 2010 for helpful comments 
and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792071
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do. The paper explores the institutional and organizational foundations of the VI 
and suggests lessons it may hold for other transnational governance challenges. 
 
JEL classification: F36, K20, K23, K33
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 I. Introduction 
 
The liberalization of financial markets has given rise to a complex and 
highly interdependent financial system, in which events in one of its parts can 
easily spread and threaten the entire system. The global financial crisis with its 
origins in the US subprime mortgage market has demonstrated the scale and 
scope of financial interdependence worldwide. Financial interdependence is 
particularly pronounced in Europe where commitments to the free flow of 
capital and financial services are strictly enforced by European Union law and 
where large transnational financial groups have emerged that control substantial 
parts of the financial system in countries outside their home state. 
The emergence of a complex, interdependent, transnational financial 
system notwithstanding, the governance of finance has continued to be national. 
Regulatory and supervisory standards may be harmonized across national 
systems; supervisory powers may be divided between home and host countries 
delegated from one national regulator to another, or coordinated in Colleges of 
supervisors. Yet, in the event of a crisis, national resources must ultimately be 
mobilized to stabilize a financial system, and where such resources are not 
sufficient, governments of those countries need to seek outside help, whether 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other states. Uncertainties about 
the ability of countries to mobilize such resources have become the Achilles heel 
of the global financial system.  
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In short, the global crisis has re-enforced the notion that the critical 
ingredient for an effective governance regime in finance is the allocation of last- 
resort financial responsibility (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 2006). Nonetheless, 
no international regime has touched fiscal sovereignty, which rests firmly with 
the nation state. The European Monetary Union has been resolute in preserving 
fiscal sovereignty,2 although the establishment of a permanent bailout facility to 
safeguard the Euro – the European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) -- 
acknowledges the need for a European lender of last resort mechanism.3 Against 
this background it is not surprising that the immediate responses to the global 
financial crisis were national across the board: The US acted in 2008 as if the 
survival of Lehmann Brothers was primarily a matter of US concern, only to be 
forced to reconsider when the firm’s bankruptcy effectively shut down 
transnational inter-bank lending markets. Even within the European Union, 
which has sought to integrate financial markets within a harmonized governance 
structure, the initial response to the crisis was national: Countries whose 
financial sector was threatened by the crisis moved to protect ‘their’ financial 
system. Only in a second step were public commitments made to abstain from 
                                                 
2 The Euro crisis has called this principle into question, but so far relevant parties have 
emphasized the exceptional nature of the transnational fiscal bailout, suggesting that they are 
eager to return to fiscal sovereignty. 
3 The ESFS was established in June of 2010 as a joint stock company under laws of Luxembourg. 
Its stated purpose is to provide financing to member states of the European Union whose 
currency is the Euro, subject to an agreement with the EC that stipulates the use of those funds 
(Art. 3, Statute of the ESFS, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-
documents/index.htm (last visited 15 March 2010)). A framework agreement between the ESFS 
and several EU member states sets forth details for the operation of the facility. See ibid. 
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serious beggar-thy-neighbor strategies and ways sought to coordinate crisis 
management. French President Nicolas Sarkozy coordinated such a meeting 
when France held the presidency of the Council of the EU in the fall of 2008. 
Notably, however, the meeting on 12 October 2008 in Paris4 was limited to the 
heads of states that were part of the Euro-zone (with the UK joining as an 
observer), and did not directly address the deepening crisis in CEE. From the 
perspective of the EU and its leading member states, this was deemed to be a 
domestic problem of these countries and those whose banks were active in the 
region, but not a European one. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the IMF, which is charged with managing the global 
financial system, does not much alter the governance lacuna in transnational 
finance. In fact, it tends to re-enforce fiscal sovereignty by structuring relations 
with states strictly in a bilateral fashion. In the midst of the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997/8, it dealt with each country separately;5 and not surprisingly, it 
faulted the domestic institutions in each country for the crisis notwithstanding 
differences among them.6 Countries that may be directly affected by an 
                                                 
4 For the details of the meeting and the resolutions adopted, see “Summit of the euro area 
countries: declaration on a concerted European action plan of the euro area countries”, available 
at http://eu2008.fr (last visited 20 March 2011). 
5 Each country signed its own agreement with the IMF, a summary of which was contained in a 
letter of intent. See for example, the ‘letter of intent’ signed by South Korea on 24 December 1997, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/122497.htm (last visited 14 March 2011). 
6 See (Boorman et al. 2000), discussing the key policies the IMF implemented, including macro-
economic responses and institutional reforms. The review article highlights the need for 
institutional reforms, stating that “in particular, reforms in the financial and corporate sectors 
were needed to address the root causes of the crisis with a view to restoring confidence and 
preventing a recurrence” (ibid at 9), however, without explaining the alleged institutional 
dysfunctionalities in any detail. 
Comment [CLS1]: Insert last visited date 
in fn. 
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agreement between the IMF and another member state may not even know 
about it, much less participate in it. In other words, the IMF may be international 
in the manner in which it pools resources and establishes governance standards, 
but is strictly bilateral when it comes to the allocation of these resources and the 
conditioning of their use. It is therefore not well equipped to facilitate the 
governance of interdependent financial systems, which requires coordination 
among multiple countries and governance agencies. 
This paper argues that interdependent financial systems require 
coordinated governance regimes; and that this applies not only to ex ante 
regulation, but also ex post fiscal responsibility. Governing interdependent 
financial markets requires mechanisms for managing last-resort public and 
private financial responsibility during a crisis as well as principles for regulating 
and supervising financial markets ex ante in a manner that is consistent with the 
expected ex post allocation of costs associated with a financial crisis.  
The paper suggests that such a regime has emerged in the form of the 
Vienna Initiative (VI). The VI is a multi-stakeholder governance regime that was 
formed to fend off a financial meltdown in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 
2008/9. It brought together transnational banks; regulators, representatives of 
ministries of finance, and central banks from home and host countries; as well as 
international financial institutions; and it did so in a manner that gave each of 
these stakeholders a voice in an open forum that made credible the informal 
commitments they made to one another. The immediate results of the Vienna 
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Initiative are impressive: Not a single subsidiary of a transnational bank group in 
the CEE market has collapsed as transnational groups agreed not to withdraw 
from Central and Eastern Europe in an uncoordinated fashion and some instead 
recapitalized subsidiaries located in these countries. Home and host countries 
effectively shared the burden of supporting transnational financial systems 
under the auspices of a joint action program that was organized by and with the 
financial support from international financial institutions (IFIs).  
This paper seeks to explain how this task was accomplished against the 
strong bias in favor of national fiscal sovereignty and the coordination problems 
actors faced. It also explores the likelihood that the VI can survive, or that similar 
arrangements might emerge for governing other interdependent transnational 
systems. The paper argues that important explanations can be found in 
organizational features of players that assumed a central role in the VI, in 
particular the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and 
draws lessons from the analysis for governing interdependence in other settings. 
 
II. Against the Odds: The Emergence of the VI 
 
 The VI derives its name from a series of meetings in Vienna, which, 
beginning in late 2008, brought together key stakeholders in the pan-European 
financial system in an effort to save it from destabilization, if not collapse. The 
participating countries were not limited to EU member states: Participation was 
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based on the actual reach of the pan-European market, and by implication on 
exposure to its crisis, not on formal treaties.7 Initial ad hoc meetings with 
different stakeholder groups (bankers, fiscal authorities from selected countries) 
culminated in a joint meeting of all stakeholders in March 2009 in Vienna. At the 
meeting each stakeholder group made public its commitment to prevent the 
deepening of the crisis. Most of these commitments were subsequently 
implemented through a process that entailed multi-stakeholder arrangements 
within each affected country.  
The foundations for the emergence of a pan-European financial system 
were laid in the 1990s when, with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU 
moved towards greater integration of its financial markets. The Maastricht 
Treaty is best known for preparing the currency union; however, it also laid the 
groundwork for the deeper integration of financial services. Most importantly, it 
committed EU member states to full capital mobility not only vis-à-vis one 
another, but also vis-à-vis third countries.8 The scope of the pan-European 
financial market was substantially expanded after the collapse of the socialist 
system, which ushered in an era of liberal market reforms in the countries of 
CEE. In their eagerness to transform their economies and catch up with the West, 
countries throughout the region opened their financial markets to foreign capital 
and financial services even prior to joining the EU, at which time capital market 
                                                 
7 The VI included Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Attempts to also include Ukraine were 
ultimately unsuccessful, apparently because of political impasses in Ukraine.  
8 See Art. 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty). 
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liberalization became mandatory. By the same token, these countries became 
important markets for Western European banking groups that acquired large 
parts of their domestic banking sectors. As a result, at the outset of the global 
crisis in 2007, foreign bank groups controlled between 36 (Slovenia) and 98 
(Estonia) percent of the banking systems in the new member states of the EU 
(Enoch 2007). The most active foreign bank groups in the region came from 
Austria, Sweden, Italy, and France, i.e., from countries whose financial sectors 
were not among the leaders in the global financial marketplace. For them, the 
opening of Eastern Europe offered a unique opportunity to expand the regional 
marketplace. For the most part, foreign groups acquired local subsidiaries, 
although some also set up branches in CEE host countries (Haselmann, Pistor, 
and Vig 2009). The presence of foreign banks has been widely credited for the 
rapid development of financial markets in the region. For some time this looked 
like benign evidence of the region’s catch-up with its Western neighbors, 
although the pace of change raised some concerns. Credit markets in CEE 
expanded by an unprecedented rate of between 17 and 67 percent annually in the 
years prior to their accession to the European Union (Arcalean et al. 2007; Berglöf 
et al. 2009). Those applauding the rapid expansion of credit markets included 
foreign bank groups that recorded unprecedented growth figures, and their 
home regulators. The Austrian National Bank, for example, reports that in the 
years prior to the crisis the annual rate of growth in credit expansion by Austrian 
banks in CEE countries was 20 percent on average, and close to 50 percent in 
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Bulgaria and Romania (ONB 2009). Whether or not these growth rates would 
have been sustainable absent the global financial crisis remains an open question. 
The crisis certainly dealt a severe blow to a model practiced in developed and 
emerging markets alike that relied heavily on high-leverage ratios of financial 
intermediaries masked by complex capital structures, short-term financing in the 
inter-bank lending markets, and the general perception that rapid credit 
expansion would be sustainable in the long term (Claessens et al. 2010; Stiglitz 
2010).  
When the global crisis unfolded, each stakeholder in the pan-European 
financial system faced a unique set of incentives. The bank groups had become 
highly integrated pan-European groups. They had operations in multiple 
countries and operated them as vertically-integrated groups with little regard to 
legal differences between branches and subsidiaries, and the regulatory 
implications associated with this formal distinction (ECB 2005). Decisions were 
made at headquarters in a centralized fashion and transmitted to local 
operations. At the outset of the crisis these groups appeared to be sufficiently 
diversified to survive a shock in one part of the system without having to scale 
back their operations considerably. Empirical evidence across a large number of 
transnational bank groups suggests that transnational financial groups tend to 
cross-subsidize major subsidiaries9 after downturns in their respective markets in 
an attempt to stabilize the group (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2010). Pan-
                                                 
9 Defined in the study by de Haas et al as ownership of at least 50 percent.  
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European bank groups did just that in 2007 and the beginning of 2008, which 
explains why the financial systems in the CEE region remained fairly stable 
during the early period of the crisis (Berglöf et al. 2009). This changed, however, 
when the parent banks themselves were caught in the global financial downturn. 
They were now confronting the need to re-capitalize core operations and, if 
necessary, to withdraw capital from more remote places.  
The parents’ home country regulators re-enforced the impetus to 
concentrate on the core. Regulators are national institutions and have a mandate 
to regulate entities within their territorial jurisdiction; they are also accountable 
to national politicians and their domestic constituencies. Their priority, therefore, 
was to ensure the stability of entities within their jurisdiction. As the financial 
crisis deepened, calls for recapitalizing core operations in the parent banks’ home 
markets turned out to be insufficient, so governments devised bailout packages 
for them (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2010). This move galvanized national political 
accountability. Bailing out domestic banks turned out to be a difficult sale; 
bailing out foreign subsidiaries was not an option. Domestic bailout packages 
came with the explicit or implicit condition that they be used exclusively at 
home.10 This created the very real danger that transnational bank groups would 
                                                 
10 The German law on stabilizing the financial sector (Gesetz zur Errichtung eines 
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds) adopted on 17 October 2008 limits the fund’s facilities to 
financial institutions with headquarters in Germany (See Sec. 2). Similarly, Austria limited its 
bailout facility to financial institutions regulated under its banking legislation, which includes 
branches of Austrian banks in other countries, but not their subsidiaries. See Sec. 1 of the 
Interbank-Market Stabilization Law (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz) of 21 October 2008 in 
combination with Secs. 1-8 of the 1993 Banking Law (Bankwesengesetz). 
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withdraw capital from CEE in a disorderly fashion, potentially leading to a 
massive capital flight and financial collapse. 
Regulators in CEE countries with strong presence of foreign bank 
subsidiaries responded to the spread of the crisis by taking defensive measures. 
Most had initially welcomed the rapid expansion of credit markets.  Some had, 
however, tried to stem the flow of credit in the years leading up to the crisis, as 
they feared that the initially welcomed credit expansion had morphed into an 
unsustainable credit boom that could well end in a bust. The countermeasures 
they took, such as increasing reserve requirements or imposing credit ceilings on 
banks within their jurisdiction, proved largely unsuccessful (Hilbers, Ötker-
Robe, and Pazarbasioglu 2007). Foreign bank groups frequently sidestepped 
them by lending directly to customers in foreign markets,11 or by channeling 
capital through unregulated financial intermediaries.12  Against this background 
host countries felt neither an obligation to insure the deposits of foreign 
subsidiaries nor to provide them with liquidity when the crisis hit. Some even 
threatened to ring-fence assets of bank subsidiaries as capital was leaving their 
countries (Popov and Udell 2010).13 
                                                 
11 This practice was legally rooted in the “European Passport System”, which allows a bank that 
has been duly authorized anywhere within the European Union to offer financial services in all 
other member states without facing additional entry barriers.  
12 The Austrian National Bank investigated the lending practices of Austrian banks in 2009 and 
reports that many used leasing companies and direct lending to continue credit expansion in 
countries where restrictions were imposed on their subsidiaries. See (ONB 2009). 
13 Popov and Udell (2010) document that foreign bank subsidiaries were more likely to curtail 
credits and reduce their capital than domestic banks. 
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The European Central Bank (ECB) saw the crisis in CEE unfolding, but 
was institutionally constrained to intervene because most afflicted countries fell 
well outside its jurisdiction. Sweden, whose banks had expanded in the Baltics, is 
not part of the Euro zone, and among the new member states that were at the 
center of the unfolding financial storm, only Slovenia had already adopted the 
Euro (in 2007), with Slovakia to follow in 2009. As the crisis deepened, however, 
the ECB engaged in some liquidity provisioning to the central banks of Denmark, 
Sweden, Poland and Hungary. These measures fell well short of those taken by 
the US Federal Reserve (Fed), which extended liquidity provisions for selected 
countries around the world, accepting local currencies as collateral.14 In contrast, 
the ECB required Euro denominated collateral from countries that were not part 
of the Euro zone (Moessner and Allen 2010). 
At first, the EU Commission, its Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, as well as the Committee for European Bank Supervisors 
(CEBS), the EU’s major coordinator for EU-wide banking regulation, also 
remained on the sidelines. This was somewhat surprising, as no other region in 
the world has built as many formal institutions to facilitate financial market 
                                                 
14 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the US (Fed), Press Release 29 October 
2008, announcing temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with the Banco Central do Brasil, 
the Banco de Mexico, the Bank of Korea, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore, after having 
previously announced similar facilities with the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, 
Danmarks Nationalbank, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, the Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National 
Bank. Available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081029b.htm (last visited 15 
March 2011).  
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integration, which one might have expected to be in the first line of response.  
However, the stress test imposed by the crisis revealed that national sovereignty 
trumped European coordination. The EU’s credibility as a regional governance 
regime had already suffered a blow when the leading countries of the union – 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and (less surprisingly) the UK – responded to 
the crisis by unilaterally creating their own bailout regimes with only scant 
attention paid to how this would affect the common market and its various 
member states.  The EU Commission’s attitude to the crisis was revealed in a 
Communication of 29 October 2008 entitled “From Financial Crisis to Recovery: 
A European Framework for Action”.15 The report recognized the threat of a 
severe credit crunch and called for a coordinated response of central banks and 
governments, yet failed to formulate such a plan itself and instead called on the 
IMF and the G20 to ensure a global response to the global crisis. 
For their part, the governments of countries that were implicated by the 
unfolding crisis in CEE were divided on whether to call on European institutions 
to come to their rescue.  Among the CEE countries, Hungary openly sought a 
common European rescue package for the region, but was turned down.16 Other 
CEE countries, however, were opposed to an intervention that could be 
interpreted by the market as a sign of widespread contagion. The Czech 
Republic, in particular, sought to distance itself from the Hungarian move in 
                                                 
15 COM(2008) 706 final. 
16 “Ailing in the East: European Union leaders decline to bail out Eastern Europe”, The 
Economist, 1 March 2009, available at www.economist.com (last visited 15 March 2011).  
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order to avoid the impression that it was implicated by Hungary’s ills. Other 
member states of the European Union, whose banking systems had long 
benefited from expanding in the CEE region, were equally hesitant. They 
apparently did not want to be seen as trying to Europeanize a problem that could 
be perceived to be a problem of their domestic financial intermediaries. Instead, 
they hoped that the worse afflicted countries would receive help from the IMF, 
and that this would mitigate any effect of local meltdowns on the broader 
system.17 This hope was not misplaced. In the past, the IMF had repeatedly 
played the role of lender of last resort and crisis manager in countries that were 
unable to cope with a financial crisis, whether in Latin America, East Asia, or 
CEE in earlier ‘emerging market’ crises.18 The IMF entered into standby 
agreements with several countries in the region, including Hungary and Ukraine 
in October 2008, but the bilateral approach did little to address the problem of 
the integrated regional market. 
In sum, structural incentives of key stakeholders in the pan-European 
system were not conducive to coordination, even though each stakeholder had a 
lot to gain from it. A classic prisoner’s dilemma story was unfolding in the fall of 
2008 with potentially systemic consequences for the regional and global financial 
systems.  The VI emerged in this context. Several stakeholders began to push for 
a coordinated response in light of the deepening crisis. The heads of several bank 
                                                 
17 In its financial stability report of June 2009 the Austrian central bank stated with some relief 
that ‘in light of recent rescue measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios 
have become much less likely’ (ONB 2009). 
18 The role of the IMF in managing these crises has been much disputed. See (Wade 2000). 
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groups with a strong presence in CEE met and wrote a letter to the European 
Commission (EC) that was copied to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the EBRD.19 The letter sought to put pressure on CEE countries to grant liquidity 
support to local subsidiaries. By calling simultaneously on the EU Commission 
and other transnational institutions, the banks were exposing the governance 
vacuum at the heart of the pan-European financial system: the lack of an ultimate 
guardian for the system (Pistor 2011). 
The banks’ call notwithstanding, the EU Commission stayed on the 
sidelines, as it had throughout the earlier stages of crisis when member states 
took their fate into their own hands and bailed out their domestic banks. It may 
have decided that resolving the crisis ultimately involved fiscal resources, which 
squarely falls within the responsibility – and sovereignty – of individual member 
states, not the EU; or it may have thought it wise to sit out the crisis and leave 
responsibility for its fallout to member states, only to emerge with a powerful 
integration plan once the crisis had run its course.   
The most proactive player in the unfolding crisis in CEE was the EBRD. It, 
in collaboration with the Austrian Ministry of Finance, organized several 
brainstorming sessions in the fall of 2008, each initially devoted to a single group 
of stakeholders (banks, ministers of finance, regulators). The EBRD also 
                                                 
19 Stefan Wagstyl, “Banks ask for crisis funds for eastern Europe”, The Financial Times, 21 
January 2009, available at www.ft.com (last visited INSERT DATE).  The banks involved in the 
initiative were Raiffeisen and Erste Bank (Austria); Unicredit and Intessa Sanpaolo (Italy); Societe 
General (France); KBC (Belgium); Bayerische Landesbank (Germany); Swedbank (Sweden); SEB 
and EFG Eurobank (Greece).  
Comment [CLS2]: Insert last visited date 
in fn. 
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mobilized the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the EIB in order to 
provide resources to pan-European bank groups to prevent a major capital 
retrenchment in the CEE host countries where they maintained subsidiaries. In 
addition, the EBRD orchestrated a Joint IFI Action Plan, “In Support of Banking 
Systems and Lending to the Real Economy in Central and Eastern Europe”, 
which was co-sponsored by the EIB and the World Bank Group.20 Under the 
terms of this agreement, €24.5 billion were made available for 2009-10.21 While 
these amounts were not sufficient for safeguarding the region, the plan signaled 
the commitment by IFIs to tackle the crisis as a regional crisis rather than several 
distinct national ones. The timing of the joint action plan was even more critical 
than the amounts made available. It signaled a clear commitment to regional 
financial stability at a time when deteriorating conditions in Romania and Serbia 
put the region at risk (Nitsche 2010).   
Second, the EBRD helped mobilize important stakeholders, including 
regulators, fiscal authorities, and central banks from both home and host 
countries of transnational bank groups with strong presence in the region, for a 
series of meetings in January of 2009 in Vienna,  and also facilitated meetings 
during the same time period in crisis countries with IMF delegations and 
representatives of bank groups.  
                                                 
20 See http://www.eib.org/about/news/joint-support-for-central-eastern-and-southern-
europe.htm (last visited 19 March 2011).  
21 Details of the IFI Joint Action Plan are available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/090227.htm (last visited 19 March 2011).  
 19
These meetings laid the groundwork for a joint meeting in Vienna in 
March of 2009 at which all major stakeholders were present: banks, IFIs, finance 
ministries, regulators and central banks from host and home countries, the EC, 
and the ECB as an observer.22 After a day of discussions in which each group of 
stakeholders was able to voice its needs and demands on others, the following 
commitments were made:23 
 
- Bank groups promised not to disengage from CEE, to recapitalize subsidiaries 
if needed, and to make their commitments public; 
- Host countries committed to conduct reasonable macroeconomic policies in 
accordance with IFI agreements, to provide liquidity and deposit insurance to 
subsidiaries of foreign bank groups, and not to ring-fence assets; 
- Home countries agreed to make bailout money available to bank groups 
without constraining where these resources were used; 
- IFIs offered funding to pan-European bank groups, to stand by individual 
countries, and to stay engaged in monitoring regional developments.  
 
                                                 
22 One stakeholder arguably was missing, namely the taxpaying public in the home countries of 
the parent banks. Formally speaking, they were, of course, represented by their home country 
central banks, regulators, and ministries of finance – as they had been when these very same 
agents allowed the rapid expansion strategy of home banks without regard to their potential 
systemic effects. 
23 (Nitsche 2010). Similar commitments were reiterated after an expanded meeting in September 
of 2009, which was now relabeled the “European Bank Coordination Initiative”. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10106.htm (last visited 20 March 2011).  
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Each of these commitments went well beyond the narrow self-interest that 
had characterized the immediate responses to the crisis in 2008. This was made 
possible because they were reciprocated in an open forum by commitments from 
other stakeholders. As one participant of the meeting observed, the open forum 
in which multiple stakeholders participated and voiced their concerns induced 
each one to offer more than they individually had been willing to give: “It 
pushed them to their limits”.24 None of the commitments were legally binding, 
nor were sanctions announced for defectors. Neither was the meeting simply a 
venue for a mediation process between home and host countries, or banks and 
IFIs. Mediation entails splitting differences typically in a situation where 
litigation remains a fallback option, or where one party might walk away from 
the deal unless a reasonable solution is found. In contrast, the VI created ground 
rules for an informal governance framework that required extensive 
collaboration among the stakeholders to effectively stabilize the financial system. 
These ground rules were as simple as they were powerful: open discussion 
among all relevant stakeholders; publicity about commitments made; and trust 
and authority bestowed on the EBRD as the coordinator-in-chief.  
Between March and June 2009 a series of meetings followed that focused on 
individual countries one at a time. The meetings served the purpose of 
identifying specific needs of the country and the bank groups operating in the 
country, and the role of the IMF and other multilateral lending organizations, as 
                                                 
24 Interview with VI participants, on file with the author. 
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well as that of the home country regulators and central banks. Following the 
procedural rules established by the VI, at each of these meetings parent banks 
signed commitment letters for the countries in question, and these commitments 
were made public (Nitsche 2010). In addition, separate meetings were held 
during the annual spring meeting of the IMF and the Annual Meeting of the 
EBRD with home and host country representatives to assess the implementation 
of the VI.   
In September 2009, another full VI meeting was held in Brussels, this time 
under the chairmanship of the Director of the EU’s Directorship General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), John Berrigan. Seventeen parent 
bank groups, up from six that had called for a European response to the crisis in 
November of 2008, their home and host country supervisors, and fiscal 
authorities participated, as did the IMF, the EC with representatives from the 
Directorate-General for Competition and CEBS, the EIB, the World Bank, and the 
EBRD.25  
The EU’s embrace of the VI can be seen as an endorsement of its success. It 
coincided with developments inside the EU, where a reform package for 
financial sector governance was announced in September 2009 and enacted in 
                                                 
25 See “Largest Foreign Banks In Hungary Pledge Support To Local units” with a summary of the 
concluding statement of the joint forum meeting held in Brussels on 24 September. Available at 
http://www.xpatloop.com/news/62975 (last visited 5 February 2011). See also the IMF release 
on the commitments made at the meeting, supra note 23. 
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January 2011.26 This reform package sought to strengthen the EU’s hand in 
regulating financial markets, but also recognized the limits of further 
centralization of regulatory and supervisory control at the level of the EU. The 
new framework strengthens existing committees charged with developing 
common standards for the regulation of European financial markets, elevating 
them from ‘committees’ to ‘authorities’. The Committee for European Bank 
Supervisors (CEBS), for example, was reincarnated as the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). Critically, the reform proposal explicitly confirmed national 
sovereignty in fiscal affairs by including a provision that states that the new 
European System of Financial Regulators shall not take any action that might 
implicate fiscal sovereignty of the EU’s member states.27 Given the apparent need 
for fiscal burden sharing in the context of transnational financial crises, this 
confirmation of formal fiscal sovereignty effectively undermines the EU’s quest 
for a greater governance role in the pan-European financial market. Against this 
background the VI provides a possible answer to the paradox of national fiscal 
                                                 
26 See REGULATION (EU) No 1092/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board; and DIRECTIVE 2010/78/EU OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 November 2010 amending 
Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 
2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers 
of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European 
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the 
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) 
27 See specifically the REGULATION (EU) No 1093/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/78/EC, which establishes in recital 5 that while the new European supervisors 
should aim at playing an important role in crisis management, they should not “impinge on the 
fiscal responsibilities of Member States”.  
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sovereignty in a world of transnational finance: coordinated multi-stakeholder 
governance.  
 
 III. Multi-Stakeholder Governance of Interdependent Financial Systems 
 
The emergence of coordinated multi-stakeholder governance was not a 
spontaneous response based on the rational assessment of key players that only 
concerted actions would contain the crisis. Each stakeholder knew this to be true, 
but each individually faced political and institutional constraints that prevented 
it from taking the necessary actions to bring about coordination. A critical 
question, therefore, is how these obstacles were overcome. This goes to the heart 
of the question how new governance regimes emerge.  The global crisis has 
demonstrated that existing arrangements that are rooted in national regulation 
and fiscal sovereignty are inadequate for a highly interdependent transnational 
financial system. New institutions, however, are usually not born out of insights 
that existing ones do not work. Even more importantly, the scale of re-ordering 
necessitated by the globalization of finance implies that existing stakeholders 
would need to make room for new actors who were not effectively represented 
before – most critically, in the case of Europe, host countries to pan-European 
financial groups’ expansion strategies. Yet few players, if any, voluntarily leave 
the stage to others.  
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The emergence of new institutions and new forms of governance28 is one 
of the least understood issues in social theory. The importance of institutions for 
economic, political and social life is widely recognized, yet little is known about 
how institutions come about – that is, about their ‘genesis’ (Padgett and Powell 
2010 ). Some stress the importance of exogenous shocks or competitive pressure 
for ensuring continuous institutional adaptation (Olson 1982). From this 
perspective, the VI might be explained as a response to a major crisis that 
literally shocked key agents into action. Yet, as the descriptive account in the 
previous section has shown, achieving coordinated outcomes takes more than 
the recognition by all relevant actors that coordination is indispensable for crisis 
resolution. The relevant stakeholders clearly faced a collective action problem 
(Olson 1971). Still, no one moved before a group of banks went public; moreover, 
there was very little certainty as to which actor would be able to effectuate 
coordination – much less how one might identify such an actor in advance. As 
noted previously, the bank groups that pushed for a coordinated response wrote 
a letter simultaneously to three different organizations (the EC, the EIB and the 
EBRD), which suggests that they too were uncertain as to where to turn for help.  
Others emphasize that institutions are devices that shape collective 
behavior and suggest that change must come from actors that are recognized as 
                                                 
28 There is much confusion in the literature about the difference between institutions and 
governance regimes. Institutions are usually understood as the “rules of the game” humans 
devise to constrain their actions (North 1990). Governance refers to the guidance of others – i.e. to 
mechanisms that constrain those that are guided. In that sense, there is not much difference 
between the two concepts. I will therefore use them interchangeably. 
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authoritative (Greif 2006). Established authorities, however, are only rarely 
entrepreneurs of institutional change (Hardy and McGuire 2008) – and can 
hardly be expected to acquire this role when the most important required change 
is to cede ground to others. By this account the most authoritative agents in the 
pan-European crisis should have come from within the EU – directly from the 
Commission or from CEBS. Yet, these were precisely the agents that remained 
almost completely passive during the initial formative stages of the VI. In a 
changing world in which private actors compete with sovereigns and 
international agencies for governing global finance, authority often does not yet 
exist, but must be gained.  
Research on the genesis of institutions has pointed out that institutional 
invention is often a result of institutional diversity of actors. Actors may be 
forced together by a crisis, but can also be convened by an agent that has been 
dubbed “anchor tenant” (Powell 2010). Left in isolation, actors will tend to fall 
back on established practices and knowledge, rather than break new ground. In 
contrast, bringing together actors from diverse institutional backgrounds can 
create an environment in which elements from different institutional domains 
will be recombined into new institutional solutions. An example comes from the 
origin of the “partnership system”, a new organizational form for long distance 
finance that emerged in Renaissance Florence and was critical for the emergence 
of financial capitalism (Padgett and McLean 2006). This invention enabled a 
controlling partner in a Florentine bank to establish multiple legally independent 
 26
offshoots in far afield places while retaining control and limiting the risks 
associated with agency problems. Political upheavals brought together actors 
from distinct economic and social spheres: domestic cambio bankers and 
international merchant houses. The bankers transposed their accounting and 
apprentice system into the world of elite merchant houses with established 
relations of long distance trade; and inter-marriages between merchant and 
banker families added social stability to the new organizational form.  
The political crisis in Florence was a critical moment for bringing together 
different stakeholders in the city’s political and economic system. Yet there is no 
guarantee that shocks to a system will bring about new institutions; neither are 
shocks always necessary for joining actors from diverse backgrounds. Instead, an 
intermediary who is capable of connecting actors from diverse backgrounds can 
facilitate institutional change. As Powell put it  
The anchor tenant is not disinterested, in the sense of being neutral, 
but is not directly competitive with the other types of organizations 
that inhabit the community. The organizations that I dub anchor 
tenants (...) occupy positions that provide them with access to 
diverse participants and the legitimacy to engage with and enroll 
others in ways that facilitate the extension of collective resources. 
This ability to span disparate domains has proven valuable in high-
velocity environments where resources, power, and wealth are 
constantly shifting. (Powell, 2010)29 
 
                                                 
29 Literally, the term ‘anchor tenant’ refers to a critical tenant in a newly established shopping 
center, one that is capable of attracting other tenants as well as customers. See, for example, 
(Gatzlaff, Sirmans, and Diskin 1994). 
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In the context of the 2008 financial crisis in CEE, the EBRD played the role 
of anchor tenant: As an IFI with the mission to promote economic development 
in the region it had a stake in the outcome, but it did not compete directly with 
any of the other players. Its major role was to bring together actors from 
divergent, yet interdependent, institutional backgrounds and thereby to create a 
common forum for private, public, national and multinational stakeholders in 
the emergent pan-European financial system.  
The first meetings of the VI were preoccupied with crisis management 
(Nitsche 2010).30 However, the VI has moved beyond crisis management to post-
crisis governance. In several VI meetings held in 2010, participants agreed to 
jointly tackle problems of weak financial markets and foreign exchange 
exposure, and other legacies of the crisis in CEE. Stakeholder interest in these 
meetings has grown substantially, with over 100 participants attending the 
March 2010 meeting in Athens.31 This has prompted organizers to break down 
the meeting into focus groups on specific policy issues; not, however, to step 
back from multi-stakeholder involvement. The post-Vienna development of the 
VI also signifies that this was more than an ad hoc mediation for crisis 
management. Instead, the VI created the foundation for governing 
interdependent financial markets outside existing hierarchies and jurisdictional 
                                                 
30 See also Erik Berglöf, “The crisis has changed the EBRD”, EBRD blog, 27 May 2009, available at 
www.ebrdblog.com (last visited 15 March 2011).  
31 The fact that this meeting of the VI coincided with the Greek sovereign debt crisis, another 
major crisis in the European financial system beyond the reach of the VI (see below), was 
somewhat ironic – and had not been planned. 
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preoccupations, whether at the national or regional level.  This is apparent when 
comparing the VI with the existing formal structures for governing 
interdependent financial markets – including existing EU structures. 
While the EU has adopted a series of directives and regulations in an 
attempt to standardize financial market regulation, implementation is left to 
national regulatory authorities. In an ideal setting this allocation of 
responsibilities may give rise to new forms of governance in a bottom-up fashion 
within the space created by EU law. According to Sabel and Zeitlin, the EU has 
developed such an “architecture for experimental governance” in a variety of 
policy areas (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). This architecture consists of broad 
framework policies that are established by EU bodies in collaboration with 
member states, which are gradually filled with specific content and implemented 
by stakeholders throughout the EU. In some cases, committees and other 
agencies created at the EU level facilitate this process, but such structures are not 
always necessary. Sabel and Zeitlin describe this mode of governance as one of 
deliberation and exchange of positions and ideas. Specifically, the publicly 
pronounced frameworks and the process that developed for their 
implementation have taken the form of “direct, deliberative polyarchy” (DDP). 
This resembles the multi-stakeholder governance regime the VI has created for 
the pan-European financial system. Why then did the EU’s governance 
architecture fail in the midst of the crisis, and what differentiates the VI from it? 
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The answer to this question lies in the difference between the aspiration of 
the EU’s governance regime and its actual operation. In the financial sector, DDP 
took the form of the so-called “Lamfalussy process” (Lamfalussy 2001), which 
consists of a multi-tier process for developing and implementing a set of 
regulations for the financial sector in all EU member states. The Lamfalussy 
process was first conceived for securities markets, but was subsequently 
transposed to banking regulation (Vander Stichele 2008). At the first level, EU 
directives and EU regulations establish the general policy framework. Detailed 
technical regulation is left to the second level occupied by formal committees that 
specialize in different financial services – CEBS in the area of banking.32 The 
committees convene representatives of regulators and supervisors from member 
states. They are advised to consult with the regulated industries and ensure that 
regulators from different member states coordinate with one another. In theory, 
therefore, CEBS should have been ideally placed to respond to the financial crisis 
in CEE. It was the place where banking regulators from all EU member states 
met regularly, discussed and developed implementing guidelines, and consulted 
with the banking industry. Yet, CEBS remained passive.  
The differences between the Lamfalussy process and the VI hold 
important lessons for improving the governance of interdependent financial 
markets. The Lamfalussy process has helped harmonize regulation and 
                                                 
32 Note that CEBS has now been replaced by the European Banking Authority (EBA); see supra 
note 26. 
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supervision of financial intermediaries, but is silent about financial burden 
sharing among member states, or between private and public actors. This turned 
out to be the most critical issue in the management of the crisis. The Lamfalussy 
process is also both over- and under-inclusive in relation to the pan-European 
financial system. It is over-inclusive in that CEBS included 51 regulators from all 
27 EU member states without regard to whether each of the represented 
countries actually participated in the pan-European market as host or home 
country, which facilitates coalition building and horse-trading among member 
states over a diverse set of issues at the EU level, but does not coordinate 
governance of the European financial market. It is under-inclusive because it 
does not cover non-members of the EU, even though they may be part of the 
same transnational financial market. In contrast, the VI embraced the 
interdependent pan-European financial system in its actual scope irrespective of 
formal jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, the Lamfalussy process of designing 
and implementing directives in the financial sector has been far less democratic 
and deliberative than envisioned by Sabel and Zeitlin. They themselves point out 
that certain problems in DDP remain, in particular the “possible domination by 
large states/producer interests” ((Sabel and Zeitlin 2008) at 297). Indeed, closer 
inspection reveals that the interests of home and host countries in CEBS were not 
well balanced. Most of the relevant financial service directives were promulgated 
before the new member states joined the EU; yet CEE countries became the 
primary destination markets for foreign capital. Although the new member states 
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nominally had a voice in CEBS, they were not in the inner circle of country 
representatives with long-established relations. As a longstanding member of a 
similar body in the EU system, the European Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, observed, the mode of deliberation changed considerably when the 
committee was expanded as a result of the eastward expansion of the EU (Benink 
and Schmidt 2004). The informal exchange of information and ideas was no 
longer as easy, nor did members feel as comfortable with one another as they 
had in the pre-accession period during which they had been able to build 
personal ties and trust. While not equally well documented, similar changes may 
well have beset other governance institutions within the EU. The dominance of 
old member states was equally apparent with respect to private sector 
involvement within CEBS. Private actors were consulted and commented on 
draft guidelines issued by CEBS. Such involvement came almost exclusively 
from the established financial industry and its interest groups, with scant 
representation of financial intermediaries from the new member states (Pistor 
2011).  Lastly, the Lamfalussy process suffered from the fact that CEBS, like other 
bodies within the EU framework, is dominated by representatives of nation 
states and lacks an anchor tenant that represents pan-European governance 
needs that may at times conflict with even the majority of member states.  
Fiscal sovereignty too has remained vested with the nation state. The VI 
does not challenge this de jure.  The fiscal commitments home countries of 
transnational bank groups made at the VI meetings have, however, modified this 
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principle de facto. Specifically, home countries agreed not to prevent cross-border 
transfers of the nationally provided funds made available for re-capitalizing 
‘their’ banks. They thereby effectively approved the bailout of the banks’ 
foreign subsidiaries with national funds. The major institutional invention that 
can be associated with the VI was therefore not primarily the avoidance of an 
uncoordinated withdrawal of capital from the region – as important as this 
intervention was – but a mechanism for burden sharing for diverse countries and 
actors that compose the pan-European financial system. It also signaled that 
unlike earlier financial market crises in emerging markets, the costs of 
experimenting with rapid financial expansion should not be borne exclusively by 
countries that served as hosts of foreign bank operations. This could help set the 
stage for a new bargain over regulatory and supervisory powers and fiscal 
responsibilities at the ex ante stage. 
Existing frameworks for governing transnational finance are based on a 
clear separation of regulation and fiscal responsibility. Fiscal responsibility is left 
with the sovereign nation states and regulatory responsibilities are divided 
between home and host country regulators. The Basel Concordat, first 
established by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) in 1983, allocated 
primary regulatory authority to the country in which a bank is licensed and 
incorporated, i.e. its home country.33 Countries where banks maintain branch 
                                                 
33 The original Basel Concordat of 1983 and subsequent incarnations can be found at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.htm (last visited 15 March 2011). 
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operations are host countries. Subsequent iterations of the Concordat established 
that home countries of the parent bank carry out consolidated supervision over 
the entire banking group.34 The underlying assumption for this division of labor 
is that parent banks and markets in the parent banks’ home country can be put at 
risk by inadequate regulation and supervision of their foreign subsidiaries. The 
Concordat paid scant attention to the possibility that instead, parent banks might 
impose substantial risk on host countries either through their subsidiaries or 
through their own actions.  The global crisis, which erupted in countries with 
major parent operations, and its repercussion for CEE, however, demonstrated 
that this is a substantial risk.35 Consolidated regulation is therefore not a 
satisfactory answer to the problem of transnational banking regulation. Absent 
fiscal responsibilities that are aligned with the centralization of regulatory 
control in the hands of parent bank regulators, this allocation of regulatory 
powers may in fact increase incentives to externalize the risk of rapid financial 
expansion to foreign markets.  
The VI has instead installed the idea of burden sharing among all 
stakeholders of the transnational system, including the banks themselves. As 
such, the VI has come much closer to the vision of DDP described by Sabel and 
                                                 
34 Principles for home-host country cooperation in the supervision of transnational banking 
groups were introduced in 1992 and further refined in 1996. See “The Supervision of Cross-
Border Banking”, a report by the BIS Committee on Banking Supervision and the Off-shore group 
of Banking Supervisors; available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.htm (last visited 15 March 
2011).  
35 Some commentators had pointed out the risk of this situation for host countries long before the 
global crisis. See (Herring 2007).  
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Zeitlin. For the first time, host countries from the new member states were given 
a voice; they were heard not only by home country regulators of the bank groups 
that operate on their territories, but also by the banks themselves. Banks could 
voice their views about transnational governance not only when asked to 
comment on new guidelines developed by CEBS or similar bodies; and they did 
so directly rather than through industry lobbying organizations that tend to have 
their own agendas. Conversely, home country regulators could learn from banks 
they regulate as well as from host countries about the risks these entities face and 
the risks they create as transnational groups. Last but not least, governments 
extended their fiscal responsibility to cover the markets in which their banks 
operated even beyond the territorial borders of their nation states.  
 
IV.  In Search for an Anchor Tenant 
 
Two critical factors help explain the success of the VI. First, the VI 
addressed the core problem of transnational finance, namely the allocation of 
fiscal responsibility in managing the crisis. Second, the VI benefited from the 
presence of an anchor tenant with the capacity and authority to bring key 
stakeholders together and encourage them to make credible commitments in 
managing the crisis. The legitimacy of the EBRD can be explained in large part 
by institutional design features, in particular its mandate and internal 
governance structure, which distinguish it from other IFIs. 
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The EBRD is the youngest of the IFIs, which include the original Bretton 
Woods Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as regional 
development banks in Asia, Latin America and Africa that were closely modeled 
after them. It was established in 1990 with the mandate to support the 
transformation in the formerly socialist countries in CEE from centrally planned 
to market economies.36 Like other IFIs, its equity holders are states as well as 
several international organizations. Unlike other IFIs, however, it is explicitly 
charged with working with and through the private sector.37 The emphasis on 
promoting development through the private sector follows from its mandate to 
overcome socialism in the countries within its jurisdiction. The goal was to 
strengthen non-state actors and develop viable markets, not to reform state 
socialism through state institutions. It also reflects the policy sentiment of the 
time, which placed greater confidence in markets than in governments. At the 
time the EBRD was established, the IMF and the World Bank endorsed the 
Washington Consensus, a policy that focused on macroeconomic stabilization, 
trade and financial liberalization, and privatization (Williamson 1990). The IMF 
and the World Bank, however, sought to implement these programs through 
                                                 
36 The Agreement on Establishing the EBRD was signed on 29 May 1990 and entered into force on 
28 March 1991. Documents are available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml. (last visited 
16 August 2010). 
37 Art. 1 of the Agreement specifically states that the EBRD’s mandate is “to foster the transition 
towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative 
in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of 
multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics.” Art. 2 specifies as its functions the 
development of competitive private markets through “private and other interested investors” 
and the mobilization of domestic and foreign capital to promote these ends.  
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governments, mostly in the form of fiscal austerity measures, liberalization and 
de-regulation policies, and institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the 
private sector (Worldbank 1996). In contrast, the EBRD’s approach was to trigger 
policy change through project finance: the funding of primarily (though not 
exclusively) private sector projects with the aim of developing sustainable, 
competitive markets in the former socialist countries.  
The EBRD’s mandate is reflected in how it spends its money. Less than 20 
percent of financial assets are invested in governments (treasury loan 
investments and treasury share investments); the remaining 80 percent are 
invested in private sector institutions.38 Success and failure of the projects are 
directly reflected in the EBRD’s own financial statements. In contrast, the 
traditional Bretton Woods Institutions are ultimately unaccountable for the 
policies they prescribe (Woods 2006).39 
 The provisioning of public goods (competitive markets) through private 
means (project finance) creates some inherent tensions, as the EBRD’s objectives 
as investor are not always compatible with its public policy goals. The EBRD’s 
charter, for example, requires that “sound banking principles” govern all of its 
operations.40 The EBRD’s ultimate goal, however, is public: the development of 
sustainable markets for long-term development of the region. Internal 
                                                 
38 See the EBRD’s 2009 financial report at 70. Available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/financial.shtml (last visited 16 
August 2010). 
39 For a comprehensive assessment of international organizations’ accountability, see (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004).  
40 Art. 13 (i), Charter of the EBRD. 
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governance structures have been set up to address this inherent tension between 
public goods and private means. Thus, investment operations and policy 
development are separated and subject to different monitoring mechanisms. This 
ensures sound risk management for investment projects on one hand, and 
greater flexibility for the design of policies that do not commit extensive financial 
resources.  Tensions between the two groups inside the bank – one housed in 
operations, the other in the office of the Chief Economist – exist, but tend to be 
mediated by higher-ups in the organization.  
The EBRD’s mandate to work directly with the private sector has placed it 
in much closer proximity to private actors than is usually the case for IFIs.41 This 
has situated the EBRD at the crossroads of private and public actors, with 
knowledge of and access to both, instilling the bank with the credibility to bring 
both sides together in a forum where they could develop solutions that require 
coordinated action.  
The EBRD’s internal organization and governance structure enable the 
bank to develop innovative policy initiatives outside standardized tool box, 
which is the staple of the Bretton Woods institutions. The EBRD’s policy arm is 
subject only to light monitoring and therefore capable of formulating and 
implementing innovative policy approaches without having to first go through 
an extensive bureaucratic review process. Monitoring mechanisms and reviews 
                                                 
41 The IFC is a partial exception to this rule, but unlike the EBRD, it does not combine a broader 
developmental agenda with private sector initiatives.  
Comment [CLS3]: Is this what you 
meant? 
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are, of course, critical for addressing agency problems inside an organization 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004). However, as is increasingly recognized in 
organizational theory, while traditional M-Form organizations with a 
hierarchical monitoring apparatus may be good for implementing strategies 
under conditions of certainty but tend to impede innovation, decentralized 
organizations that resemble U-Forms are more conducive to developing 
innovative solutions under conditions of uncertainty (Qian, Roland, and Xu 
2006). Traditional IFIs resemble highly centralized structures that ensure 
consistent policy implementation, but at the expense of responsiveness to events 
that are difficult to foresee. In contrast, the EBRD is not only smaller, but also 
organized in a more decentralized fashion, which fosters a more agile 
organizational culture that is more responsive to the challenges of uncertainty.   
A potential disadvantage of the EBRD is that its resources are relatively 
limited. Its annual business volume in 2009 was €7.9 billion; the accumulated net 
volume €47.7 billion.42 This forces the EBRD to coordinate with other IFIs or the 
ECB when excess resources are needed. On the positive side, a small budget 
limits the temptation to over-lend.43  Moreover, the EBRD’s modest financial 
prowess has forced the bank to reach out to other IFIs and thereby broaden the 
scope of participants in the governance of a regional crisis. Both the IMF and the 
                                                 
42 See the 2009 financial report, supra note 38. 
43 A strong argument can be made that multiplying the sources of finance is of critical importance 
when financing projects with uncertain outcomes. Having more than one creditor review a 
decision to extend financing at stage two of the project is an important commitment device 
against throwing ‘good’ money after ‘bad’ money. See (Huang and Xu 2000). 
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EU have become core stakeholders in the VI. This has greatly expanded the 
funding sources and added legitimacy to the process.   
The VI’s success in managing the fallout from the global financial crisis in 
CEE raises the question whether it offers a viable framework for governing 
transnational financial markets not only in crisis, but as a continuous governance 
regime. In light of the recently implemented financial reform package in the EU, 
one might ask more specifically whether there is still a need for the VI.  The new 
EU regime, however, incorporates many of the old regime’s defects. It does not – 
and, given its structural constraints, cannot – address the over- and under-
inclusiveness discussed earlier. It is designed for the European Union, not for 
countries outside, even though many banks based primary in a member state 
may have extensive operations outside the EU.  Moreover, it gives all member 
states a voice in the newly created regulatory bodies irrespective of their relation 
to transnational banks. In fact, the hierarchical management structure created for 
the new financial supervisors with a chairman and board44 favors representatives 
of influential EU countries irrespective of those countries’ actual exposure to the 
risks of financial market integration. The same structural features make it 
unlikely that the new authorities will respond flexibly to new challenges as they 
arise. To the contrary, the emphasis on hierarchy and authority is more 
conducive to the implementation of standardized modes of governance than to 
                                                 
44 See Arts. 6, 43, 47, 48, 53 of Directive 2010/78/EU, op. cit. at 26. 
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innovation.45 Moreover, as demonstrated by the global financial crisis, the EU’s 
formal institutions have little leverage over national interests of member states in 
times of crisis. Finally, the EU creates no space for the type of open, multi-
stakeholder forum that was critical for the VI in averting the crisis in CEE. Such a 
process greatly increases the pool of information and expertise from which 
solutions can be drawn.  It also affirms the role of private actors not only as 
targets of regulatory interventions, but as stakeholders in the governance of 




 This raises the crucial question, whether a process such as the VI can be 
institutionalized. Institutionalization is typically associated with greater 
standardization of practices and bureaucratization (Huntington 1965). This, 
however, is counterproductive for the management of new challenges that 
cannot be easily anticipated. In this context, flexibility is more important than 
standardized responses. The paradox that needs to be resolved is if and how 
flexibility and the ability to challenge existing practices, or ‘disruption’  
(Christensen, Johnson, and Rigby 2002) can be institutionalized. Theoretical work 
on management organization has long grappled with the contradiction between 
productivity and innovation, where productivity benefits from standardization, 
                                                 
45 See supra the discussion of M-Form vs. U-Form organizations under conditions of uncertainty.  
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but standardization tends to impede innovation. Empirical and experimental 
evidence suggests that a possible solution is the creation of separate subunits 
with contradictory tasks within a single organization (March 1991; Adler et al. 
2009).46 Within each subunit, organizational tasks and governance structures are 
streamlined to ensure efficiency gains; across units, tasks are only loosely 
coupled and may even be contradictory.  For this to work at the level of the 
organization, the senior team must not only develop its own models for selecting 
and implementing promising new solutions, but also ensure that experiential 
learning facilitates diffusion of new models within the existing organization 
(ibid.). This organizational model resembles the role of anchor tenants in the 
process of institutional innovation and change discussed above (Powell 2010). In 
both cases linking diverse practices is the critical element for encouraging 
learning in uncertain terrain.   
Applied to the problem of governing financial markets, the critical 
institutional design question is the role of the anchor tenant and its convening 
authorities and powers. The anchor tenant should be an agent that is capable of 
developing forward-looking strategies while exerting sufficient authority and 
legitimacy in the eyes of a diverse group of loosely coupled stakeholders to 
ensure participation in the search for new governance solutions. The absence of 
such an agent has been painfully apparent in the European sovereign debt crisis, 
where national interests have once more trumped the search for viable solutions 
                                                 
46 See also (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008) for a literature review.  
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in a transnational system.  Based on the analysis presented in this paper, such an 
agent should have the following institutional features: smallness; a flexible 
internal governance structure; relations of trust and authority with a diverse set 
of stakeholders in transnational financial markets; and expertise in and capacity 
for developing forward-looking solutions based on the input of various 
stakeholders. In the case discussed in this paper, the EBRD assumed the role of 
the anchor tenant. While it was not originally designed to perform precisely this 
task, its design features enabled it to recognize the need for and perform the 
functions of an anchor tenant. It is likely to continue to play a similar role during 
the recovery and future governance of financial markets with extensive reach in 
the region under its jurisdiction. Other markets will require a different anchor 
tenant. The insights gained from the case study of the VI presented in this paper 
can be used to identify or help design viable agents to play this role. Whatever 
the fate of the VI in its current incarnation, it can serve as a model for a new 
transnational governance regime that is capable of flexibly responding to rapidly 
changing and inherently risky financial markets.  
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